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Ca nEx pe c t ed U til i t y Theory Expl ai n
Ga mb l i ng?
by R oger H art l ey and L isa Farr ell
¤
Wei nvestigate the abil i ty ofexpected util i ty theory to account forsi mu l -
taneous gam bli ngand i nsurance. C ontrary to a previouscl aim that borrow -
i ng and l ending i np e r f ect capital m arkets rules out a dem and for gam bles,
w e show that expected util i t yt h e o r ywi th non-concave util i ty functi ons can
stil lexpl ain gam bl i ng. W hen the rates ofi nterest and timep r e f erence are
equal, agents w il l seek to gam bleu n l ess incom e fal l si na¯ n i te set of ex-
ceptionalval ues. W hen these rates di®er, there w il lbe a range ofincom es
f or whi ch gam bl es are desired. In both cases repeated gam bli ng i sno te x -
pl ai ned but m arket i mp e r f ectio n ss u c ha sd i ®erent borrow ing and l ending
rates can account for persistentgambl i ng provided the rates span the rate of
timep r e f erence.
1A ccounting f or gam bli ng presents a signi ¯cant chall enge to theories of
decision m aki ng under uncertai nt y, particularl yi n a dynam i c setting. If
expected util i t y theory ist ob eu s e dt omo d e l d e c i sion-m aki ng under un-
certaint y, the only w ay to explai ns i mul taneous gam bl i ng and i nsurance i s
to introduce non-concave segm ents i nto theuti l i ty functi on. Thi s approach
w as ¯rst taken by Friedm an and Savage [ 8]who used a uti l i t yf uncti on wi th
as i ngl e convex segm entaccom pani ed by a justi¯cation of thisshape.They
dem onstrated that a util i t yf uncti on whi ch incl uded a section with increasi ng
ma r g i naluti l i ty could account for the existence of consum ers w ho purchase
both i nsuranceand l ottery tickets.
Thee xpl anatory pow er ofthe Friedm an-Savage approach was chal l enged
by Bai l ey, O lson and W onnacott [1]who argued that non- concave util i ty
f uncti ons could not, inp r i nci pl e,expl ain gam bl i ng. The intui tion behi nd
their argum entiss i mp l e. Consi derthe Fri edm an-Savage uti l i t yf uncti on v
show n inF i gure 1 together wi th the com m on tangent to the curve at the
poi ntscand c .Wewr i te Cv forthe concave hullofv i nwh i ch the graph ofv
i sbr i dged by the com m on tangentbetween cand c. A n agent atc can m ove
up f rom v (c) to Cv (c) by buyingaf ai rgam ble between c and c. W hen there
are twope r i ods the agent has an alternative possi bi l i t y: save by consum ing
c i nt h ei ni tialperiod to ¯nance consum ption ofci n the second,or borrow
to support consum ption ofci n the ¯rst period and c i n the second period.
2W hen the ratesofinterestand timep r e f erence are equalthisdoesj ustaswel l
asgam bl i ng. W hen they di®er,oneoftheseal ternativesi s strictlyp r e f erred
to gam bl i ng.
Unf ortunately, this argum ent encounters two di±c u l ties. First, the re-
qui red pattern of saving or borrowi ng i so n l yf easiblei fi ncom e i s chosen
appropri atel y. Forexam pl e,w hen the rates of interest and timep r e f erence
are both zero,the am ountsaved i n the ¯rstperiod m ustequalthe increase
i n consum pti on i n the second peri od. Thi srequiresthatincom e be equalto
(c + c)=2. Forallotheri ncom el evelsther ewi l lbegambl es strictlypr e f erred
to the optim al pattern of saving and borrow i ng. Thi s conclusi on conti nues
to hold when theratesofi nterest and timep r e f erenceare equaland posi tive
al though there are now tw o exceptionalincom e l evels corresp onding to sav-
i ng or borrowi ng. The second di ±c u l ty isthatthe m odelofBai l ey et al.
does not all ow for the possibi l i t y thatan agentm ay wi sh to save or borrow
and gam bl e. Perm itting gambl i ng as wellas saving and borrowing can re-
store a dem and for gam bl es even w hen pure saving orborrowi ng i s strictly
pref erred topuregambl i ng. Thi sf oll ow s from the observation thatopti ma l
savi ng and borrow ing wi thoutgam bli ngwi l ltypi call yl e a dt oac o n s u mp t i on
l evel di®e re ntf rom c and ci na tl east one period. In any peri od i nw h i ch
the consum pti on l i es strictly between c and c totalexpected util i t y can be
i ncreased by gam bl i ng i n that peri od as thiss hi f ts expected util i t y upwards
3on to the com m on tangent. H ence a dem and f or gam bles is restored.
I nt h i spape r ,wee xt e nd t hemode lofBai l ey et al.b ya l l owi ng agents
to gam blea swe l las save and borrow. W i th thise x t e n s i on,the anal ysi s
show s that expected util i t yw i th non-concave util i ty functi ons can expl ain
the desire to gam blee v e nwi th perfect capital m arkets and time - separable
uti l i ty functi ons. A dem and forgam bl es w il l persist in our m odelwhen the
rates of interestand ti mep r e f erence are equalunless incom ehappensto take
one ofa ¯ni te set ofexceptionalvalues. W hen the rates di®er,there w il lbe
a range ofi ncom el evelsf orwhi ch there isa dem and forgam bl es. H ow ever,
as i nB a i l ey et al. , repeated gam bli ng can not be expl ai ned i n the m odel
wi thout invoki n gma r k e tf ail ure.
Di scom fo r twi th the notion ofi ncreasi ngm argi naluti l i ty ofm arketgoods
hasl ed severalauthorstoo®erafoundati on f ornon-concavi tiesoftheFri edm an-
Savagetypeusi ng i ndi vi sibil i ties in m arkets such as laborsuppl y (Dobbs[ 4] )
and educati on (Ng[13])o rc a p i tal m arket i mp e r f ections (K i m[ 11]). Jul-
l i en and Sal ani ¶ e[10]show that a sam pl e of racetrack bettors exhibitl ocal
risk aversion simi l ar to that arising f rom Friedm an-Savage util i ty functi ons,
wi thin the contextofcumul ative prospect theory. T hese explanations and
observationsimp l y non-concave functi onsofwealth but are vulnerabl et ot he
i de at ha tbor r owi ng and savi ng can transfo r mt h e mi nto a concave functi on.
In direct response to the B ail ey et al.c r i tique,D owel land M cLar en[ 5]show
4how a m odeli nwh i ch w age rates increasewi th w ork experience can lead to
aF r i edm an-Savage f uncti on ofnonhum an weal th w ithout i nvoking m arket
i mp e r f ections.
Thepr i nci palal ternative expl anati on ofgam bli ng i st ha ti to®ersdi rect
consum pti on value. Iti sus e f ulto di stingui sh tw o form s ofthis assum ption.
Fi rstly, and m ost simp l y, the util i ty of non-m onetary activities associated
wi th gam bli ng such as attendin gar a c eme e t i ng orview in gal ottery-related
television program w hen one has a stake in the outcom e,couldb ei ncl uded
di rectlyi nt h ec a l culati ons.H i storicall y,thisapproach hasconsi sted ofli ttle
m ore than inform al com m ents, but m ore recentlyS i mo n [ 15] has used an
expli cit` dream 'functi on to m odeldem and for lottery tickets. Johnson and
Shi n[ 9]haveesti ma t e ds u c haf uncti on for betting on horseracesusi ng data
f rom bookm akers. These authors al so pointoutpunters'behavi o rwh i ch is
hard to rationali ze w ithouti nvoking such a f uncti on.
Theot he rf orm ofthe assum ption m odi¯esexpected util i t y theory by sup-
posi ng that the m oney val ues and probabil i ties ina n yr i sky prospect have
di rect value beyond that i ncl uded i n the expressi on for expected util i ty. A
particularl ye l egant version was presented by Conl i sk [3] w ho dem onstrated
that addi ng an arbi traril ys ma l lf uncti on of the m oney val ues and proba-
bi l i ties to an otherw ise concave util i ty functi on coulde x p l ai nr i sk preferring
behavi or such as the purchase of lottery tickets. O ther non-expected util i ty
5theorie sma ye x p l ai nf eaturesofgam bli ng,such asthenatureofthepri zesin
l ottery gam es, w hic ha r eh a r dt oj ustif yu s i ng expected util i t y theory. (See
Qui ggi n[ 14] . )
However, these approaches are not without di ±c u l ties. It isu n c l ear
whe t he rdr e am f uncti onsshould beappl i ed to allri sky decision-m aking asin
Conl i sk oronly to,say,unfai rg ambl esw ith very long oddssuch asare f ound
i nl ottery gam esasi nS i mo n .Th el atter possibi l i t yl eaves m any other form s
ofgam bli ngunexpl ai ned.H owever,a uni versall y appl i ed dream functi on onl y
partial l y determ ines how the characteristics ofthe gam ble, such as the size
ofpri zes,probabi l i t yo fwi nni ng,ti mea twh i ch uncertaintyi sr e s ol ved etc.,
couldb ee x p l ai ned. W i thout a clear prescripti on ofthe nature ofthe func-
tion,it becom es a di±c u l t task to com pare the dem and for rel ated gam bl es
such as one gam bl ewh i ch isame a n - preserving ri sk spread ofanother,orto
analyze the p ortfol i o e®ects ofactivi tiessuch as layi ng¯xed oddsand spread
b e t so nt h es a mes p o r t i ng event. T he °exibi l i ty inf uncti onalf orm m eans
that, rather than expl ain gam bli ng, i ti sa l l too easy to im pose observed
behavi orby sui tablec h o i ce ofa dream functi on. Furtherm ore,the dynam i c
consistencyofsuch m odel si scontroversial[ 12]whi ch m akestheirappl i cation
i ni nter-tem poralm odelsproblem atic.
T he rest ofthe paper describes our extensi on ofthe m odelofBail ey et
al . and analyses its properties. In Section I w e form ul ate the consum er' s
6opti mi zation problem when gam bl es are avail able and dem onstrate how this
problem m ay be solved i nt e r mso far e l ated determ ini sticp r o b l em . T his
construction al l ow s us to relate the indi ®e r e nc emapswhe ng ambl i ng i spos -
sible and when i ti se xc l uded and these resul ts are appl i ed to an anal ysi so f
tw o-period probl em s in Section II.In Section III,weout l i ne results form ore
than tw o periods. In Section IV we show that the m odelcannot expl ain
repeated gam bl i ng wi thout introducin gs o mema r k e ti mp e r f ection and i nves-
tigate how di®erent borrow ing and l ending rates m ay overcom e thispr obl em .
Ourc o nc l usi ons are stated in Section V.
I. S olvi ng the m ul ti-p eriod problem
A.Me t hodol ogy
Ou ra ppr o a c hi si n threesteps.
1. W e wri te dow n the m ulti- peri od opti mi zation problem faci ng a con-
sum er w ho can borrow and save inap e r f ect capitalm arketand hasa
separableut i l i ty functi on inwh i ch intra-peri odpref erencesare re°ected
i n a non-concave uti l i ty functi on. W e refer to the optima ls o l uti on of
thispr obl em ,when no gambl esare avail abl e,astheno-gam bl i ng so-
7l uti on.
2. W e extend the previous opti mi zation probl em by al l owi ng consum ers
accessto fai rgam bl esw ith any pattern ofpayo®s. Thi si sourextensi on
oft hemode lofBai l ey et al.T h es o l ution to thisp r o b l em iss i mp l y
referred to as op tima l .
3. W e ask whether the opti malobj ective values ofthe two problem s are
t hes a mei . e. is the no-gam bli ng sol uti on opti ma l ?
A negati ve answer to the ¯nal questi on imp l i es a positive dem and f or
f ai rg a mbl esand,by conti nui ty, for som e unfai r gam bl es. W hether thiswi l l
actuall yr e s ul ti n gam bl i ngdependson thesuppl ys i deofthegam bl i ng m arket
whi ch isnotanal yzed here1.Wet h e r e f ore interpret a negative answ er to 3.
as support for the explanatory pow er of Friedm an-Savage or m ore general
non-concave von Neum ann-M orgenstern util i t yf uncti ons.
B.Theno- gam bli ngsol uti on
Sin c ewewi sh to dem onstrate that non-concave util i ty functi onscan ex-
pl ai n gam bli ng even w hen util i ty functi onsareseparable,w ew il lfol l ow Bail ey





(1 + ´)t (1)
whe r ec t i s consum ption i np e r i od t(= 1;:::;T ) and ´ > 0. W e assum e
that v is strictlyi ncreasi ng but not necessaril y concave2.I nF i gure 1,we
graph both v and i ts concave hullCvf orthe cl assicFr i edm an-Savage util i ty
f uncti o n.Theno n- concavit yo f vme a n st h a tt h e r ewi l lbeconsum pti on l evels
c satisfyi ngv( c )< Cv( c )andwewr i te (c;c) forthesetofallsuch consum ption
l evels 3.Forsuch a c;the consum er wi l lpref er to the status quo a gam bl ei n
whi c ht h ee xp o s twe a l th ise i ther c or c and the probabi l i t y ofwi nni ng i s
chosen to m ake the gam bl ef air. Indeed,therewi l lbeunf ai rgam bles giving
an expected util i t y greater than v(c). It isa l so conveni ent to assum e that
f orc< c orc> ctheconsum eri sr i sk-averse:theFri edm an-Savagefuncti on
contai nsno l i near sections4.
As s umi ng perfect capital m arkets w ith rate of interest r; the optima l








(1 + r)t,( 2 )
whe r ey ¤ i s perm anent i ncom e.
9C.Cons ume r ' s opti mi zati on probl em
Wen o wi ntroduce the possibi l i t y ofgam bl i ng by all ow ingtheconsum erto
i ncrease herweal th inp e r i od tby addi ng any random variableXt satisfying
EXt=0f or t= 1;:::;T:W e also perm ittheconsum pti on decision inp e r i od
tto depend on the outcom e ofthe gam bl eXt and random events i np r e v i -
ousperio ds .Th i sm akes consum pti on i n any peri o dar a n d o m v a r i ablea nd
wepl ace no restrictions on the joint di stributi on5 of(X 1;C 1;:::;X T;C T).
Wea l so require the budget constrain t( 2 )t ob es a t i s¯ed for every sam ple
path. T hus, the consum er's opti mi zation problem for T peri ods ,whi ch w e














(1 + r)t;a ndEX1 = ¢¢¢= E X T =0
whe r et hemaxi mi zation iswi th respect to X 1;C 1;:::;X T;C T or,equi valently
wi th respect to the joi nt distributi on ofthese random vari abl es.
D.Sol vi ng t he consumer' sp r o b l em
Thi s problem can be solved by an indi rect approach. Since the best
choi ce ofgam bl e m oves the consum er from v to Cv, w e start by solvi ng a
10mo d i ¯cati on ofthe no-gam bli ngprobl em ofthe previoussubsecti on inwh i ch
vi nt h eo bj ectivefuncti on isr epl aced by Cv. W henevertheopti m alsolution
ofthisprobl em requiresconsum pti on cbetw een cand ci n a certainpe r i od,an
opti m alsolution ofCP T i sf ound by choosing the gam bler e q ui red to obtain
expected util i ty Cv (c) int h a tp e r i od.M ore form al l y,w e proceed as fol l ow s.
Substituting Cv f or v inCP T yieldsan upperbound totheori gi nalprob-
l em since Cv ¸ v. Furtherm ore, the concavit yo f C va n dl i neari ty of the
constraintal l o wsust or e pl ace the random vari abl e swi th their expected val-
ueswi thout reduci ng the val ue ofthe obj ective functi on6.Th i ss ho wst h a t
the fol l ow ing determ inisticp r o b l em , w hich w e shallr e f er to as the deter-





(1 + ´)t subject to (2),
yieldsan upperbound f orC PT.
W e can construct a soluti on (b X 1;b C1;:::; b X T;b C T)o fCPT wh i ch achieves
this upper bound,and i st h e r e f ore optima l ,asf ol l ows. Let (b c 1;:::;b c T)be
the optim al solution of the determ ini stice q u i valent and wri te Ix f or the
degenerate random vari ablewhi ch takestheval uex wi th certainty.Foreach
t= 1;:::;T;tw o cases are possible.
Ca s e1 :v ( b c t)= Cv( b c t):
Let b X t=I 0 and b Ct=I b c t.
11Ca s e2 :v ( b c t)< Cv( b c t):
Let b X t take the val ue
b c t¡c ;wi th probabil i ty 1 ¡ ¼ and





and let b C t=b c t+ b X t:
N ote that,inCa s e2 , Eb X t= 0 asrequi red,and
Ev(b Ct)= ¼v( c)+ (1 ¡ ¼)v(c)= Cv( b c t):
T hese results are also trivi al l y true in Case 1,so the constructed solution
achi eves the upper bound. Furtherm ore,since (b c 1;:::;b c T)i sf easibl ei nt h e
determ ini stice qui valent,(b X 1;b C1;:::; b X T;b CT)i sf easibl ei n theoriginalprob-
l em on every sam ple path. W e refer to this construction as the Standard
C onstruction and conclude that an opti ma ls o l ut i on toC P T ma yb eo b -
t ained by ¯rstsol ving the det erm inisti c equivalent and then using t he stan-
dard constructi on to generate a sol uti on of CP T. Furtherm ore,the opti ma l
objecti ve values of CP T and it sd e t erm inisti c equivalent aret he sam e.
II. T w o-p eriod probl em s
12A.I ndi ®erence m aps
I nt h i s section w e describe a graphi cal approach to proble mswi th tw o
peri ods. T he starting poi nt ist heu t i l i ty functi on for the problem w ith no






(1 + ´)2:( 3 )
T he argum ent int h ep r e v i ous section shows thatC P2 hasthe sam e opti ma l
obj ective functi on val ueasi ts determ ini stice qui val entand sol ving the l atter
i nvolves substituting Cv f or v in (3).T hus,f or any reference levelof util i ty,
w e can draw a corresponding pai rofv-and Cv- i ndi ®erence curves.In Figure
2,we di spla yap a i rofi ndi ®erencecurves7 corresponding to the sam e util i ty
l evel,wherev hastheshape shown i nF i gure 1. Indi ®erencecurveI,drawn
asa soli dl i ne,i sf or v and I¤,drawn dashed wherei tdi ®ersf rom I,isf orCv.
W e note that indi ®erencecurveIdoesnot` ¯l li n'thei ndentati on i nI ¤.
Wea l so incl ude (draw n dotted)thefourl i nesc t =c and ct= cf ort= 1;2.
The s el i nesdi vide the posi tive quadrant ofthe plane into ni neregi ons.T he
centralsquare includes al l consum ption vectors corresponding to gambl i ng
i nb o t hp e r i ods. Int h i sr e g i on,Cv isl i neari nb o t hp e r i ods so that al lCv-
i ndi ®erencecurveshavethesam esl ope:¡ (1+ ´)throughoutthe square.In
13the four corner regionsthere i sno gam bli ngi ne i ther period and i ndi ®erence
curvesofv and Cv f orthesam el evelofutil i ty coinci de. T he E ast (c1 > c;c <
c 2 < c) and W est regions correspond to gam bl i ng onlyi n thesecond peri od
and the N orth and South regions to gam bl i ng onl yi n the ¯rstperi od. IfI
passes through (c1;c2)whe r ec<c 1 < c,then v(c1)< Cv( c 1)andt he r ei sa
section ofI¤ l yi ng cl oser to the origi nt h a n( c 1;c2). Simi l arconclusi ons hold
i fc<c 2 < cp r o v i ng O bservation 1. Excepti nt he f our corner regi ons,
i ncl udingt heirboundaries,a Cv-indi ®er ence curve l i es strictl yb e l ow (i. e. on
t he ori gins i de of) the v-i ndi ®erence curve correspondingt ot he sam e uti l i ty
l evel.
Weh a v ea l so included inF i gure 2 (m arked wi th dots and dashes) the
i so-slope l ocus8,L,ofal lpoi nts (c1;c2)f orwhi ch v0(c1)= v0 (c2). L isal so
the set of poin t sa twhi ch the slope ofthev- i ndi ®erence curvesi s¡( 1+ ´ )
and therefore w here the ¯rst-order condi tions for m axi mi zing U subj ect to





(1 + ´)2 =
(2 + ´)y¤
(1 + ´)2 (4)
aresati s ¯e d.Thi sgi vesObservati on 2.Al lno-gam bl i ng sol ut i ons for r= ´
l i eo nL 9.
Sincev hasa com m on tangentatcand c (see F igure1),thei so-slopel ocus
mu s ti nclude the f our vertices of the centralsquare ofF ig u r e2 .Ot h e r wi se,
14theonlypa r to fLwhi ch can enterthe fourcornerregionsist he45 ± l i ne .Thi s
can be seen by exam ining the m arginaluti l i t yf uncti on v0 f or a Fri edm an-
Savage v;w hich wehave graphed i nF i gure 3 and inwh i ch we have m arked
cand c: If (c1;c2)i sapoi ntofL wherec1 6 =c 2;t hen v0(c1)andv 0 (c2)l i eo n
t h es a meh o r i zontalli ne. Si nce thisi sa l so true of v0 (c)a ndv 0( c), at m ost
one ofc1 and c2 can fal loutsi dethei nterval(c;c).
Combi ni ngthi sr es ul twi th O bservation 2gi vesO bservation 3.Ifv(y¤)<
Cv( y¤), no-gam bl i ngsol ut i ons for r = ´ cannotl i ei nt he i nt eriorofa corner
region.
B.Theopt i ma l i t yo f n o - gam bli ng sol uti ons
Throughout thi s subsection, we assum e that v(y¤)< C v ( y ¤). W e ¯rst
exam i ne the case r = ´. Observati on 3 imp l i es that a tangency poi nt
betw een the budget li ne (4) and a v-i ndi ®erence curve cannot l i ei nt h e
i nteri orofa cornerregion. O bservation 1 all ow s us to concludethat,unl ess
the tangency poi nthappensto be a cornerpointofthe centralsquare,there
are poi nts on the Cv-i ndi ®erencecurvewi th the sam e util i ty levelw hich li e
closer to the origi n than the tangency poi nt. Thus, the sam e util i ty level
ma yb ea c h i eved int h ei nteri or ofthe budgetset when gam bl i ng i sa l l owed
so the no-gam bl i ng sol uti on i ssub-opti ma l .
15Thi si si l l ustrated inF i gure 2 w here the no-gam bli ng sol uti on i sa tt h e
i ntersection ofIand L i n the E ast region w hereas the set oftangency points
betw een the budget li ne and the corresponding Cv-i ndi ®erencecurvei sAB.
A n exceptional case w here the v-indi ®erence curve passes through the
poi nt(c;c) is shown inF i gure 4. H ere,A = (c;c) is optima lb u tt h es l ope of
both curves at A is¡( 1+ ´) :Th ec o mpl ete set ofoptima ls o l uti ons i st h e
l i ne-segm ent A B . H ence there is an optim alno-gam bli ng sol uti on although
there are alternativeopti ma l s o l uti onswhi ch do invol ve gam bli ng.The s ear e
the only exceptions and occuronl yi fone ofthese cornershappens to l i eo n
the budgetl i ne whi ch requires that
y
¤ =[ (1 + ´)c+ c ] = ( 2+ ´)ory
¤ =[ (1 + ´)c + c]=(2 + ´): (5)
T hese results establi sh the next theorem .
The o r e m 1 I fc<y ¤ < c and (5) does not hold,the no-gam bl i ng sol ut i on
i ss ub - opti ma l 10.
W e now turn to the case r 6 = ´ and start from the case r = ´ w hen
the tangency setbetween the budgetl i ne,whi ch has slope ¡ (1 + ´); and the
opti m alCv-i ndi ®erencecurvei st hes etADB i nFi gure2.A sri ncreasesabove
[ decreases below]´,t hebudge tl i ne rotates [anti] clockwise. T he tangency
poi ntwi th the C v-i ndi ®erencecurveal wa ysl i esabovethe45± l i neand m oves
16away from it. T hisi si l l ustrated inF i g u r e5 ,wh e r ew eh a v er e d r a wnt h e
i ndi ®erencecurvesf rom F igure2.Forthebudgetl i neB1;theoptim alsolution
i sA1 and i ti sc l e art hatt heno- gam bl i ng sol uti on i ssub- optima l .Thepoi nt
A 2 i sopt i ma l f orthe budgetl i neB2:A 2 i sal so the no-gam bli ngsol uti on but
onl yi n a trivial sense: the optim al solution does not i nvolve gam bli ng i n
spite ofthe non-concavi ty ofv. W e m ay concl ude that,provi d e dri sno tt oo
di ®erentf rom ´, there isar a ng eo fi ncom esf or whi ch forbi ddi ng gambl i ng
m akes consum ers w orse o® and thus forw hich there is a dem and f or unfai r
gam bl es. T hisr e ma i ns true even for the exceptional cases, (5), identi ¯ed
above: an exam inati on ofthe indi ®erence curves from F igure 4 shows that
i fr> ´;al lgl oball yo p t i ma ls o l uti ons li e on both curves whereas,i fr< ´;
there are in c o mel evelsf o rwh i ch the no-gam bl i ng sol uti on i s sub- optima l .
W ehaveestabl i shed the foll ow ing result.
T heorem 2 T here isa±> 0s u c ht hat,ifr6 =´a n dj r¡ ´j< ± ;t here is
range of incom el evelsf or which the no-gam bl i ng sol ut i on iss ub - opti ma l .
C.Pur eg ambl i ng
I nt hi ssubsecti on,wel ookatthet wo- peri od probl em sstudi ed by B ail ey et
al . w ho com pared the no-gam bl i ng sol uti on with pure gam bli ng i . e. w ithout
17i nter-tem poralsubstitution,and cl aime dt h a tt h ef orm erwouldb ep r e f erred
(weakl yi fr= ´) .
W hen r = ´,w e can carry out the com parison inF i gure 2. The budget
l i ne coi nci des wi th the optima lC v - i ndi ®erence curve i n the centralsquare
so that the pure-gam bl i ng sol uti on i sf ound atthei ntersection ofthe indi f -
f erence curve and the 45± l i ne (poi nt D i n the ¯gure). Unl ess this curve
passes through (c;c)o r( c ;c),itl i es below the v-i ndi ®erence curve wi th the
sam e util i ty level by O bservation 1, inw h i ch case D isp r e f erablet ot h e
no- gam bl i ng solution. H ence, unless incom e happens to sati sfy (5), pure
gam bli ng i ss t rictlyp r ef erred to borrow ing and savi ng11.
Wh e nr6 = ´;the results are am biguous. InFi gure 6 we have drawn Cv-
and v-i ndi ®erence curves for the sam e util i ty level as w ellast w o possibl e
budget l i nes passing through the poin tD,wh e r et h eCv - i ndi ®erence curve
crosses the 45± l i ne.ForB1B1,puregam bl i ng i spr e f erable to borrow ing and
savi ng w hereas, for B 2B 2,the converse is true. Indeed,as the budget l i ne
through D rotates clockwi se beginni ng at a l ow anglewi th the horizontal
axis,it starts by crossing the correspondingv- i ndi ®erencecurve.Then,af ter
reaching a cri tical slope, w here iti s a tangent, i t ceases to cross the v-
i ndi ®erence curve. Thi s conti nuesunti la second tangency poi nt is reached
after w hich the v-indi ®erence curvei scrossed agai n.Thi s m eans that there
wi l lbei nterest rates rD and rU (> rD )such that,i fr D <r <r L,t hen pur e
18gam bl i ng ispr e f erred to borrow ing and savi ng w hereas,ifr< r D o rr> r U ,
pref erences are reversed12.
III. M ore than tw o periods
Ther e s ul ts of the previous section extend to m ore than two pe r i ods.
Wh e ni ncom e li es betw een c and ca ndt h er a t e so fi nterest and timep r e f er-
ence are equalthere w il l stil lb ead e ma n df or gam bl es. In particular,the
no- gam bl i ng sol uti on ofCP T,f orT > 2,i ss ubo pt i m alprovi ded i ncom edoes
notf al li na¯ n i te set of exceptionalval ues. H ow ever, this set grows expo-
nenti all yl arger as the num ber of periods i ncreases, for exceptional incom e
l evels correspond to a consum ption pattern equalto either c or ci ne a c ho f
the T periods. T hisl eads to 2T ¡ 2 such incom e levelsb e t w een c and c.
Furtherm ore, as T increases the exceptionalval ues¯l li nt h ei nterval (c;c)
and the per- pe ri od val ue ofthe opti m alno-gam bl i ng solution13 approaches
Cv. Thi sa c c o r d swi th the intui tion behi nd the anal ysiso fBa i l ey et al.
Themo r epe r i ods are avail able ,t hemo r ec l osel y theconsum ercan repl i cate
the gam blewh i ch m oves her fr o m vo n t oC vu s i ng a f easibl e pattern ofde-
term inisticc o n s u mp t i on. Such a concl usi on suggests that the dem and for
gam bl e swi l ldi sappeari fthe num berofperi odsisal l ow ed to becom e in¯ni te.
Con¯rm ati on ofthi s suggestio nma yb ef ound i nad e t a i l ed analysi so ft h e
19i n¯ni te horizon case carried out in Farrelland Hartl ey [6] .
T he conclusi ons of the previ ous secti on al so extend to m ore than tw o
peri ods w hen the rates of i nterest and ti mep r e f erence di®er. Provi ded
thisd i ®erence i s not too great, the opti ma ls o l uti on of the determ inistic
equival ent of C P T entail s consum ption at a level between c and ci ns o me
peri od fora range ofi ncom es. Em pl oying the standard construction we¯nd
that the optim alsolution ofC PT requiresthe consum er to gam bl ei n that
peri od. H ence,there w il lbe a range ofi ncom es forw hich the no-gam bl i ng
soluti on iss ub- opti m aland adem and f orgam bl e swi l lpersi st fo r T>2 .B y
contrast w ith the resultwhe ni nterest and timep r e f erence rates are equal,
this dem and doesnotgo away as the num berofperi ods approaches in¯ni ty.
Fora rangeofi ncom es,consum erswi l ldem and gam bl es even ifthe num ber
ofperi odsi sunl i mi ted.
IV .R epeated gam bli ng
Al though a posi tive dem and for gam bl i ng i sp r e d i cted for Friedm an-
Savage uti l i t yf uncti ons, w hen r 6 = ´, expected util i ty-theory stil lha sdi f -
¯cul t yi ne x p l ai ni ng repeated gam bl i ng.Fora Fri edm an-Savage uti l i ty func-
tion,gambl es w il lbe dem anded in atm ostone period inCPT both f or¯ni te
20or in¯ni t eT. Fo rT = 2,t hef actthatthe budgetl i ne has sl ope ¡ (1 + r)
whi l st the Cv-indi ®erence curveshave sl ope ¡ (1 + ´) in the centralsquare
m eans that the optima ls o l uti on cannot l i ei n the centralsquare and thi s
rules out gam bli ng inb o t hp e r i ods .Forge ne r a lT,t her e s ul tf ol l ow s from
the ¯rst-ordercondi tions f or the determ ini stice q ui valent ofC P T:






f or t = 1;2;:::;whe r e¸ i samu l tipl i er. Ifr 6 = ´,there can be at m ost one
value oftfor which the righthand si de of(6) i s equal to the slopeofCvi n
the interval(c;c). H ence,c <c t< cf oratm ostonetwhi ch,by the standard
construction,leads to a dem and f or gam bl es in at m ost one peri od. Even
when r = ´,al though there can be optima ls o l uti ons involvi ng gam bl i ng i n
every period,theopti m alsolution i snotuni queand there wi l lt ypi call y( e . g.
f ora Fri edm an-Savageutil i ty functi on)beal ternative optima l s o l uti onsthat
entailgam bl i ng in at m ost one period.
I n contrast to these theoreticalresults,periodicgam bli ngbehavi or seem s
to b e w idespread. For exam ple,parti cipants i nl ottery gam es typi call yp u r -
chase a sm al lnum berofti ckets each w eek rather than m aking a l arge pur-
chase inas i ngl e w eek. T he inabil i ty ofthe m odelto account for repeated
gam bl i ng i s a serious probl em that can only be avoi d e db ymo d i f yi ng the
obj ective functi on or the constraint(or both). The l atter invol ves dropping
21the assum ption of a perfect m arket for borrow ing and saving and we now
show that an interest rate w edge can account fora dem and f or gam bl i ng i n
every period.
A.A mode lwi th an im perfectm arket
W esupposethatrB and rL(< rB) are the borrow ing and lendi ng rates,re-
spectively. T he consum er'sopt i mi zation probl em w it hma r k e tf ail ure,whi ch






sub ject to W t+ 1 =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
(1 + rB )(W t+y ¤ +X t¡C t)
i fW t+y ¤ +Xt¡C t·0
(1 + rL)(W t+y ¤+X t¡C t)
i fW t+y ¤ +Xt¡C t>0
f or t= 1;:::;T
and W 1 =0 ; WT+1¸0 ;
whe r eW trepresents accum ulated weal th (or, ifnegati ve,debt)atthebegi n-
ni ng ofperi od t.
Wewi l lappl y the m ethod of Section I by ¯rst noting that, si nce v i s
22strictlyi ncreasing and rL <r B ,the equati on forW t+ 1 can be replaced w ith
W t+ 1 ·( 1 + r B)(W t+y ¤ +X t¡C t), and
W t+ 1 ·( 1 + r L)(W t+y
¤ +X t¡C t),
wi thoutchangi ng the setofoptima ls o l uti onsofCM FPT.
Since the obj ective functi on can be regarded as a concave f uncti on of
(W 1;X 1;C 1;:::;W T;X T;C T;W T+1)a n dt h ei nequal i ty constraints are li n-
ear,w e can apply Jensen'si nequal i ty14 and argue as before thatan opti ma l











w t+ 1 ·( 1 +r B )(w t+y ¤ ¡c t)




f or t= 1;:::;T
and w 1 =0 ; w T+1¸0
f ol l ow ed by the standard construction to obtainas o l uti on to C M FP T.
Toi l l ustrate the appli cation ofthi sr e s u l t,considerFi gure 7 i nwh i ch w e
have drawn a budgetli neB1B1 f orCMFP2 whi ch has a kink at D w here i t
crosses the 45± l i ne and a sl ope of ¡ (1+ rB )be l o wa n d¡( 1 +r L)a b o v e
D.The nD i st heo pt i ma ls o l uti on o fCMFP2 provi ded the slope ofthe Cv-
i ndi ®erence curve l i es betw een the slopes ofthe tw o sections ofthe budget
23l i ne whi ch requires rL ·´ ·r B . Weh a v ee s t a b l i shed, for T = 2, the
f ol l owi ng theorem w hich ispr o ve df orgeneralT i n theappendi x.
The o r e m 3 I fr L ·´ ·r B and v(y¤)< C v ( y ¤), then (y¤;:::;y¤)i sa n
opti ma ls o l ut i on of the determ ini sti c equivale ntofCMFPT and corresponds
t og a mb l i ngi n every period.
I fr L >´[ or´ > rB ] ,t heopt i ma ls o l uti o n o fCMFP2,i st hes a mea si n
SectionI Iwi th r = rL [ orr = rB ] .I nt hi scase (and f orgeneralT )there wil l
be atm ost one period ofgam bl i ng.
Wen o t et h a tt h es o l uti ons referred to in T heorem 3 predi ct gam bl i ng
or borrow ing and saving butnotbothi ne a c hp e r i od. A m ore sophi sticated
m odeli srequired to explai nb o t hb o r r o wi ng orsavi ng and gam bli ngi ne v e r y ,
oratleast m ore than one,period.
V.Co nc l usi on
I thasnotbeen ouri ntenti on int h i s study to deny the explanatory power
ofnon-expected util i ty theories ofdecision-m aking orthatgam bl i n gma yo f -
f er directconsum pti on val ue. R ather,w e have explored the extent to whi ch
expected util i t yt h e o r yw i th non-concave util i ty functi ons can account f or
gam bl i ng i na ni nter-tem poralsetting and have dem onstrated that the the-
24ory can expl ai nad e s i re for gam bli ng even w hen capitalm arketsare perf ect
and util i ty functi ons are separabl e. O ur argum ents have not exploited the
f act that intra-peri od pref erences are the sam e for al lpe r i ods and we ex-
pect broadlys i mi l ar conclusi ons to holdf or m ore generalpreferences over
consum pti on stream s provided wem ai ntai ni nter-peri od separabi l i t y.
H ow ever,w hen the rates ofinterest and timep r e f erence di®er,i ti sopt i -
ma l t og a mb l ei n atm ostoneperi od. Even when theseratesareequal ,con-
sum ers w il lprefertogam bleatm ostonce,weakl yi ffai rgam bles are avail abl e
and strictlyi fo nl y unf ai r gam bl es can be bought. O ne way to account for
repeated gam bl i ngusi ngexpecteduti l i ty theory ist oi nvokem arketfai l ureas
i n the preceding section15.Anal ternative approach i st op e r mi ti nter- peri od
i nteracti ons. Thi sc o u l d change the results substantial l y. For exam pl e, if
pref erences in oneperi od are positivel yr e l ated to previous consum ption,as
i n B ecker and M urphy's m odelofrati onaladdi ction [ 2],repeated gam bli ng
i s possibl e. N evertheless, itwoul d seem unli kel y thathabi tuation ist hes ol e
explanati on forrepeated gam bl i ng.A n em pi ricalstudy ofl otto participati on
by Farrelle tal . [ 7]¯ndsevi denceofhabi t-f orm ati on,but i ts extent iss ma l l
and appears i nadequate as a com pl ete m odel of repeated purchase of lotto
tickets.
25Appendi x
Pr oofofThe or em 3
Wewi l lshow thatthe proposed soluti on satis¯es the K uhn-Tucker condi-
tions w hich,given the concave objective f uncti on and l i near constraintsare
necessary and su± cient foropti ma l i t y. W e arethus assum ing di ®erenti abil i ty
ofv (and therefore ofCv).
Wec a ne l i mi nate the constraintw1 =0 i n the determ inistice q u i val ent
o fCMFPT by substitution. W rite Á t ¸0 [ Ãt ¸0 ] f or the Kuhn- Tuc ker
mu l tipl i er associated w ith theupper[ l ow er]constrainthavi ng w t+ 1 on its left
hand si de i n the resulting probl em and ' ¸ 0 for the m ul tipli er associated
wi th w T+1 ¸ 0. The optima l i ty condi tions at the proposed solution can be
wr i tten
[ Cv] 0(y¤)
(1 + ´)t =( 1 + r B )Á t+( 1 +r L)Ã t f or t= 1;:::;T ;
Át¡ 1 +Ã t¡ 1 =( 1 + r B )Á t+( 1 +r L)Ã t f or t= 2;:::;T ;
ÁT +Ã T =' :
Wea l so have the requirem ent that any m ul tipl i er associated w ith a non-
bi ndi ng constraint m ust be zero, but, at the proposed solution w 2 = ¢¢¢=
wT+1 =0 ; s o a l lconstrai nts bi nd. I ti s readil yv e r i ¯ed that the opti ma l i ty
26conditions are sati s¯ed ifwes et
Át =
(´ ¡ rL)[Cv] 0(y¤)
(rB ¡r L)(1 + ´)t+ 1 ¸0 ;
Ãt =
(rB ¡´ ) [ Cv] 0(y¤)
(rB ¡r L)(1 + ´)t+ 1 ¸0 ;
f or t= 1;:::;T and ' = ÁT +Ã T.
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1Ho we v e r , i tcan be show n thatifenough consum ersw i th identi calprefer-
encesdem and an unfairg ambl et h e ywi l lbeabl et oi ncrease theiri ndi vidual
expected util i ties by betting wi th each other.
2Wea l so assum e that either v isde¯ned f or allcort her ei sami ni mu m
acceptable consum pti on l evel(w hich we¯x arbi traril ya t0 )a twh i ch v ap-
proaches¡ 1 :Thi s assum ption,m ade for expositionalconvenience, avoids
corner solutions w hich com pli catebutdo notsubstanti all ymo d i f y our con-
clusi ons.
3Forthestandard Fri edm an-Savage f uncti on,thesetofcforwhi ch v(c)<
C v(c) is a connected set. T he results in the paper do not depend on thi s
propert y;the argum entextends to the generalcase.
4Thi s assum ption avoi ds` thick'i ndi ®erencecurvesi n thesubsequentanal -
ysi s.
5It is naturalal so to require independence ofCt and X t+ 1;:::;X T but
doi ng so hasno e®ecton ourconcl usions.
316Form al l y,thisi san appl i cation ofJensen'si nequal i ty.
7Al though the curvesdrawn have a secti onbowe d a wa yf rom the origi n,
thisi s not necessaril y the case for alli ndi ®erence curves.M athem ati ca N ote-
bookscontai ni ng com pl ete indi ®erencem apsand otherdi agram s (incl udi ng
the locusL i ntroduced bel ow )based on speci¯cfuncti onalform sareavai l abl e
f rom the authors.
8Al though we have drawn L asa bounded,sym m etri c curve (plusthe45±
l i ne) onlyt h es y mme t r yi sa uni versalproperty. It isq ui te possibl ef orL to
vary wi del yi n shapeand even beunbounded.
9Ho we v e r ,no ta l lpoi nts on L are no-gam bl i ng soluti ons. The 45± l i ne
i sa l ways part of the l ocus but,where the i ndi ®erence curve i s concave to
the origina si t crosses thisl i ne,thesecond ordercondi tions are notsatis¯ed.
Eve npoi ntswherethesecond ordercondi tionsare sati s¯ed m ay be onlyl ocal
m axima .
10Wee s t a b l i sh this and the f ol l ow ing theorem using graphicalm ethods
assum in gaF r i edm an-Savage uti l i t yf uncti on. T he result can be general -
i zed (w ith an extended set of exceptionalval ues) to functi ons w ith several
non-concave segm ents and to m ore than twope r i ods,usi n gamo r ef orm al
argum ent,whi ch w e om it. Proofsareavai l ablef rom the authors on request.
11Ba i l ey et al.i mp l i citly assum ed (5) int h e i rargum ent.
12I fr= r D orrU ;the consum er i si ndi ®erentbet w een the alternatives.




14Convexi ty of the feasibl er e g i on i s essential .I ft hi swe r ef alse,we could
use gambl es to `¯l li n'i ndentations i nt h ef easible set thereby potentiall y
i ncreasi ng theval ueoftheobj ective functi on.
15See al so the suggestion by D owelland M cLaren[ 5]that i nt h e i rmo de l
an i ndi vi dualunabl e to borrow against f uture earni ngs m ay repeatedlya c -
cum ulate sm allsum swi th w hich to w ager.
33